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The False Claims Act and the Eroding Scienter in
Healthcare Fraud Litigation
RichardDoan,JD.
Imagine the following hypothetical: You're a physician, tired of the
administrative hassles and politics of large hospital life. You and two of
your medical school friends have opened up a small neighborhood clinic,
"Corazon Medical, Inc." Your customer base consists almost entirely of
elderly and low-income individuals who depend on Medicare and Medicaid
for their healthcare needs. Although a fine physician, you are neither
organized nor particularly knowledgeable about legal matters. Therefore,
you delegate regulatory compliance and billing to your partners and medical
technicians.' To your knowledge, your customers are happy and business is
great-that is until you receive an ominous letter from the government.
The government letter reads, in part:
Corazon Medical, Inc. is under investigation for administering medical
diagnostic tests by non-certified technicians, in violation of 42 C.F.R. §
410.33.2 Monetary claims submitted to Medicare for these tests have
been suspended. Should it be found that Corazon Medical has violated
federal or state laws, regulations, or policies, your company may be
subject to criminal and/or civil sanctions, including monetary fines and
exclusion from the Medicare program.4

Juris Doctor, University of Houston Law Center, 2009. The author practices administrative
law and develops regulatory policy for the federal government. The opinions express here
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States.
1. See generally HOYT W. TORRAS, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: A PHYSICIAN'S
GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE 22 (2d ed. 2003).
2. 42 C.F.R. § 410.33(g)(1) (2009) (requiring that an independent diagnostic testing
facility operate "its business in compliance with all applicable Federal and State licensure
and regulatory requirements."). 42 C.F.R. § 410.33(g)(12). (2009) (requiring the facility
"[h]ave the technical staff on duty with the appropriate credentials to perform tests.").
3. 42 C.F.R. § 410.33(h) ("[Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services] will revoke a
supplier's billing privileges if an [independent diagnostic testing facility] is found not to
meet the standards in paragraph (g).").
4. John M. Degnan & Sally A. Scoggin, Avoiding Health Care Qui Tam Actions, 74
DEF. COUNS. J. 385, 385-86 (Oct. 2007); see also Robert Salcido, The Government's
Increasing Use of the False Claims Act Against the Health Care Industry, 24 J. LEGAL MED.
457, 464 (Dec. 2003) (stating that "various United States Attorney's Offices would write to
all healthcare entities . . . they believed were violating the FCA. The government's letters
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Increasingly, the federal government's approach to this common
hypothetical is to punish the healthcare providers.5 Administratively, the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services may revoke a Medicare or
Medicaid provider's license.6 Judicially, the U.S. Attorney's Office may
prosecute violations of criminal provisions under the False Claims Act
(FCA). More likely, though, the U.S. Attorney's Office will bring suit to
collect not only the government's money, but also to collect massive fines
and interest. 8 Under the rubric of anti-fraud enforcement, the government
will endeavor to bankrupt your quaint, community clinic in a manner
consistent with two maxims:
"Leave no stone unturned." In tackling problems arising out of
Medicare and Medicaid claims, the U.S. government has made it clear that
it will not tolerate fraud.9 It has pursued every imaginable cause of action
against defrauders, from common law fraud and unjust enrichment, to
violations of mail and wire fraud statutes.' 0
"Throw the book at them." Not only will the U.S. government pursue
every legal remedy available, but it will also employ aggressive tactics in
exacting emphatic punishments against defrauders." It uses the FCA to
penalize healthcare providers, large and small, with attention-grabbing
fines. 12
This paper addresses the federal government's expansive methods in
tackling healthcare fraud, particularly in misapplying the FCA. Although
tasked with the obligation of curtailing fraudulent submissions of Medicare
and Medicaid claims, the U.S. government must also rein in the current
trend of using the FCA against smaller medical providers. Part I of this
paper provides a brief overview of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, as
well as an outline of the claims submission process. Despite heavy
regulation, this process is fraught with potential pitfalls for the
unsophisticated medical provider and arguably invites the submission of
false claims. Part II explores the FCA itself, including not only the
statutory text but also the FCA's historical and modern-day purpose. As the
threatened these entities with treble damages and massive civil penalties.").
5. See Degnan & Scoggin, supra note 4, at 385; Salcido, supranote 4, at 458, 462.
6. See Degnan & Scoggin, supra note 4, at 386; 42 C.F.R. § 410.33(h).
7. Degnan & Scoggin, supra note 4, at 386.
8. Id. at 385-87; see Salcido, supra note 4, at 462.
9. See, e.g., Degnan & Scoggin, supra note 4, at 385-86.
10. See generally TORRAS, supra note 1, at 59-66, 70-71 (discussing statues aimed at
fraud, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), mail and
wire fraud, civil monetary penalties and false statement statutes).
I1. Degnan & Scoggin supra note 4, at 385-87; see Salcido,supra note 4, at 462.
12. See TORRAS, supra note 1, at 25; see also Degnan & Scoggin, supra note 4, at 38587; see also Salcido, supra note 4, at 457.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol20/iss1/5

2

Doan: The False Claims Act and the Eroding Scienter in Healthcare Fraud

2011]

False Claims Act

51

FCA's original focus has ebbed in significance, the government has
increasingly applied the FCA to circumstances that do not evince actual
fraud. In doing so, federal courts have effectively eroded the statute's
critical scienter' requirement. Moreover, the FCA was recently amended
under the authority of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009
(FERA), which has made it even easier to establish liability. Part III
criticizes the erosion of the scienter requirement and the government's
overly broad interpretation of the FCA, especially in light of the fact that
more appropriate equitable remedies are available. The common-law
doctrines of "payment by mistake" and "unjust enrichment" adequately
address the payment of non-fraudulent, albeit false, Medicare and Medicaid
claims. Yet, the federal government pursues these appropriate remedies
only in the alternative, essentially when the government fails under the
FCA. Thus, Part IV of this paper argues for reform and calls for a clear
delineation between remedial and punitive measures. In cases involving
smaller medical providers, courts should strictly limit the FCA to instances
where fraud is clearly manifest. Part V concludes this paper's analysis of
the FCA.
I. HEALTH CARE AND FRAuD

A. Medicare Basics

Authorized under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act in 1965, the
Medicare program was established to assist elderly and disabled Americans
with their healthcare expenses. 14
After a number of amendments, Medicare is now comprised of four
parts.' 5 Part A provides insurance coverage to eligible beneficiaries' 6 for
hospital stays and expenses' 7 associated with inpatient medical care.' 8
13. "Scienter" is the "degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for
the consequences of his or her act or omission." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1337 (8th ed.
2004).
14.
EARL D. HOFFMAN, JR., BARBARA S. KLEES & CATHERINE A. CURTIS, BRIEF
SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID: TITLE XVIII AND TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT 5 (2007), availableat http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareProgramRatesStats/

downloadsfMedicareMedicaidSummaries2007.pdf.
15. Medicare originally consisted of only Part A and Part B. Part C was later
established through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and Part D was created by the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. HOFFMAN,
KLEES & CURTIS, supra note 14.
16. ROBERT FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
1-10 (2008) (explaining beneficiaries eligible for Part A Medicare coverage typically
comprise those individuals age sixty-five and older or those persons with disabilities or endstage renal disease.).
17. Id.
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Completely distinct and independent, Part B of the Medicare program
provides beneficiaries with outpatient care, typically physician services and
medical supplies.19 Part C, adopted in 1997, grants expanded insurance
coverage to allow Medicare beneficiaries the option of participating in
private healthcare insurance plans,20 including HMOs.21 Finally, Part D of
the Medicare program assists beneficiaries with prescription drug costs.22
In 2007, more than 44 million people participated in Part A, Part B, or
both.23 Overall, healthcare costs have increased significantly over the past
few decades, and the costs are expected to continue to grow.24 In 2006,
Medicare expenditures reached $408.3 billion. 2 5 Furthermore, as the
nation's population ages over the next couple of decades, more and more
individuals will be Medicare eligible, and the duration of their eligibility
will likely increase.26
B. MedicaidBasics
The Medicaid program, established under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act, is a cooperative venture between the federal government and
the states that provides help to low-income individuals and families who
cannot afford the high costs of health care.27
Medicaid is an entitlement program managed and partially funded by the
states. 28 Through various statutes, regulations, and policies, however, the
federal government has established broad national guidelines for the
administration of state Medicaid programs.29 In addition, the federal

18.

MARK ALLEN KLEIMAN, THE TANGLED WEB-A TRIAL LAWYER'S SURVIVAL GUIDE

To FEDERAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS (July 2005), ATLA Annual Convention Reference

Materials, Vol. 2, at 5.
19. FABRIKANT, supranote 17, at 1-11.
20. HOFFMAN, KLEES & CURTIS, supra note 14. Part C is more commonly referred to as
the Medicare Advantage program, but prior to 2003, it was called the Medicare+Choice
program. Id.
21. KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 10.
22. HOFFMAN, KLEES & CURTIS, supra note 14.
23. Id. at 6.
24. See id. at 3-4.
25. Id. at 15.
26. See Steve Calfo, Jonathon Smith & Mark Zezza, Last Year of Life Study, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, 3, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
ActuarialStudies/downloads/Last Year of Life.pdf.
27. HOFFMAN, KLEES & CURTIS, supra note 14; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (Supp.
2009) (editorially transferred from 42 U.S.C. 1396 by Pub. L. No. 111-3 (2009)).
28. See HOFFMAN, KLEES & CURTIS, supra note 14, at 16. Each state sets its own
eligibility requirements, the scope of services covered, and the rate of payment. As a result,
Medicaid provisions vary widely by state, including their designations. Id.
29. Id.
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government contributes a significant amount, at least fifty percent of a
state's contribution, to fund Medicaid. It also reimburses all, or nearly all,
of a state's expenditures for select Medicaid programs and services.31
These federally matched funds and reimbursements enable state Medicaid
programs to assist low-income residents with an array of healthcare
services, such as inpatient and outpatient care, vaccinations, physician
services, laboratory testing, pregnancy and pediatric care, and rehabilitation
services.3 2
In terms of expenditures, state Medicaid programs have grown
considerably over the years. 33 In 2004, nearly fifty-nine million people
participated in state Medicaid programs.34 The federal and state costs of
administering the programs constitute nearly fourteen percent of total
healthcare expenditures in the United States. 35 As the nation's population
ages, long-term health care through Medicaid will become increasingly
important and increasingly expensive. 3 6
C. Claims Submission & Reimbursement
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the federal
agency that oversees the administration of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs.37 CMS contracts with outside organizations (known as "carriers"
or "intermediaries") to handle the processing of Medicare claims. 3 8
To receive reimbursement for submitted claims, a healthcare provider"
30.

KLEIMAN,

supra note 18, at 1.

The exact amount reimbursed by the federal

government is calculated using each state's per capita income. HOFFMAN, KLEES & CURTIS,

supra note 14, at 21.
31. Id. (explaining the federal government reimburses 100 percent of the costs
associated with the Qualifying Individuals program and for services provided through the
Indian Health Service. It reimburses the states ninety percent of expenses used for family
planning services.).
32. Id. at 19-20.
33.

PAMELA H. BucY ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD 1-10 n.31 (1999).

34. Id. at 1-17.
35. See Christine M. Shaffer, The Impact of Medicaid Reforms & False Claims
Enforcement: Limiting Access By Discouraging Provider Participation in Medicaid
Programs,58 S.C. L. REV. 995, 996-97 (2007).
36. In 2004, the average Medicaid cost per beneficiary for nursing home care was
$24,475, compared with a $2,400 average for an adult beneficiary who did not require
nursing home care. HOFFMAN, KLEES & CURTIS, supra note 14, at 22-23.

37. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [hereinafter CMS] falls within the
Department of Health and Human Services. CMS was formerly known as the Health Care
Financing Administration. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 14.
39. In this paper, health care or medical "provider" includes those providers listed in 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395x(s) and (u) (2006) (e.g., physicians, durable medical equipment suppliers,
medical testing facilities, and nursing homes), as well as "any other person or organization
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must apply for enrollment in the Medicare or Medicaid program through
CMS. 4 0 If CMS accepts the application, the provider is issued a 10-digit
National Provider Identifier (NPI) number to be used for billing and
identification. 4 1 Once validated and enrolled, the provider may then submit
reimbursement claims for medical services and supplies provided to eligible
Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries.42
Claim processing procedures and rules vary with each program. For
instance, hospitals and other institutional service providers under Medicare
Part A are reimbursed using a predetermined amount based on the
beneficiary's medical diagnosis.4 3 The federal government, however,
reimburses Medicare Part B services and supplies on a "fee for services"
basis, which is capped using a fee schedule.44 State Medicaid programs
typically follow a vendor payment system, in which the state pays or prepays the provider directly for services and supplies. 4 5 The federal
government then reimburses a part of the state's expenditures. 4 6
Prior to a medical provider obtaining reimbursement, however, it must
properly submit a claim to the government via carriers and intermediaries.4
First, the provider must fill out and submit a claim form. 4 8 In addition to
basic provider information, such as the NPI, the form should also include
the appropriate CPT 4 9 and ICD-9 codes.50 The CPT codes identify the type
of service or supplies rendered by the provider, 5' while the ICD-9 codes
identify the reason for the services or supplies. 52 Medical providers should
who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business." 45 C.F.R. §
160.103 (2010).
40. See
generally
CMS:
MEDICARE
PROVIDER-SUPPLIER
ENROLLMENT,
http://www.cms.gov/MedicareProviderSupEnroll (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
41. See CMS, The Who, What, When, Why & How of NPI: Informationfor Health Care
Providers(August 2006), availableat http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareProviderSupEnroll/
downloads/EnrollmentSheetWWWWH.pdf.
42. See id
43. BUCY ET AL., supra note 33, at 1-11.
44. The fee schedule is established by a scale known as the Resource-Based Relative
Value Scale. Id. at 1-12.
45.

HOFFMAN, KLEES & CURTIS, supra note 14, at 21.

46.
47.

See id
See id. at 14.

48.

TORRAS, supra note 1, at 183.

49.

The American Medical Association's Physician's Current Procedural Terminology

(CPT).

CMS, MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL:

CHAPTER 23 - FEE SCHEDULE

ADMINISTRATION AND CODING REQUIREMENTS 26 (October 26, 2007), available at http://
www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/downloads/clml04c23.pdf [hereinafter CLAIMS PROCESSING
MANUAL].

50.

TORRAS, supra note 1, at 183.

51.
52.

Id. at 244.
Id.
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use the ICD-9 codes reflecting the "highest degree of specificity" with
53
These codes are
respect to the descriptions of symptoms or diagnoses.
54
used in part to determine coverage and payment amounts.
When a CMS carrier or intermediary receives provider claims for
reimbursement, it usually reviews them with an automated computer claims
processing program.55 During this prepayment audit, CMS rejects claims
that are likely incorrect or medically unnecessary.5 6 In addition, CMS
carriers and intermediaries conduct post-payment audits on a routine basis
to investigate suspicious claims that have already been paid out.57
Carriers and intermediaries also have their own fraud departments that
review and investigate suspicious claims.58 When they discover evidence of
fraud or abuse by a provider, they refer the case to the Office of Inspector
General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).59
The OIG intensifies the investigation and determines whether or not to
move forward with administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions. 60 If the OIG
finds that prosecution is warranted, it presents the case to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to pursue criminal and/or civil penalties against the

provider.61
D. HealthcareFraudand Abuse 62
The Problem. Without a doubt, fraud and abuse continue to plague
America's healthcare system. For example, a recent CMS experiment in
South Florida and Los Angeles uncovered significant fraud involving
suppliers of durable medical equipment. 6 3 In South Florida alone, the
53. CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, supra note 49, at 7.
54. Id. at 6.
55. TORRAS, supra note 1, at 183.
56. Id at 184.
57. See generally id at 186, 190-92 (outlining an example of the post-payment audit
process).
58. Id. at 175.
59. Id at 175-76.
60. Id.
61. TORRAS, supra note 1, at 176-77.
62. In this paper, the terms "fraud" and "abuse" are used together to describe
noncompliance with Medicare and Medicaid laws by healthcare providers. However, the
terms are distinct and should not be construed as interchangeable. "Fraud" (as a non-legal
concept) can be viewed as an "intentional deception or misrepresentation that someone
makes, knowing it is false, that could result in the payment of unauthorized benefits." Id. at
5. In contrast, "abuse" can be considered those "actions that are inconsistent with sound
medical, business, or fiscal practices." Id. (quoting CIGNA HEALTHCARE, JURISDICTION C
SUPPLIER MANUAL: CHAPTER 14 -FRAUD AND ABUSE 2-3 (2010)).
63. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Fact Sheet: Medicare Provider
Enrollment Demonstration Involving Suppliers of Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics,
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Medicare billing privileges of 634 providers were revoked after a federal
contractor conducted investigations of 1,472 suppliers.64 And in 2006, as
part of its White Collar Crime Program, the FBI investigated 2,423 cases of
healthcare fraud, which resulted in 534 criminal convictions.65 These
statistics demonstrate that healthcare fraud remains a drain on the national
treasury. 66 Some estimates of federal funds lost to fraud and abuse reach
ten percent of the nation's total healthcare costs. 67
Factors. What exactly drives so many medical providers to defraud the
government? Health care is particularly prone to fraud and abuse.68 A
number of factors contribute to the high levels of fraud and abuse in the
U.S. healthcare system. Economics, for one, plays a pivotal role. As
healthcare demand continues to rise, the supply of qualified medical
providers and the amount of government spending may not keep up with
the nation's healthcare needs. This rising demand creates an incentive, for
both medical providers and beneficiaries, to "bend the rules" when

necessary. 69
Key characteristics of the healthcare system lend themselves to fraud and
abuse. 70 For instance, Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries often do not
have full knowledge of the necessary medical care they need, and the bulk
of their medical costs are covered by the government.7 1 Consequently,
beneficiaries lack motivation to monitor costs or question their providers
about services that may not have been medically necessary.7 2 Furthermore,
the government reimbursement structure invites certain types of fraud.73
Fee-for-service reimbursement systems, such as with Medicare Part B,
make it easy for providers to misrepresent their services, to bill for services
that were not performed, and to accept referral kickbacks. 74 Capitated
systems, on the other hand, encourage entities, like HMOs, managed care

Orthotics andSupplies (DMEPOS) in High-Risk Areas, July 2, 2007 at 1.
64. Id.
65. Degnan & Scoggin, supra note 4, at 386.
66. See BUCY ET AL., supra note 33, at 1-4.
67. Id. at 1-3.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1-20 - 1-23.
70. See generally KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 2 (describing specially fraudulent schemes
in Medicaid and Medicare).
71. See Memorandum from the Volume-and-Intensity Response Team, Office of the
Actuary, to the Chief Actuary, CMS (Aug. 13, 1998), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
ActuarialStudies/downloads/PhysicianResponse.pdf.
72. See id.
73. See Timothy S. Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critiqueof the
Backlash Against FraudandAbuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REv. 239, 251-54 (1999).
74. See BUCY ET AL., supra note 33, at 1-20 - 1-21.
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organizations, and insurers, to maximize profits, and thereby, provide
incentives to unlawfully cut costs and supplement revenue. 75
Another major factor contributing to fraud and abuse, especially in the
claims submission process, is the sheer complexity of the Medicare and
Medicaid systems. Medicare has been described as an "amazing array ...
of reporting, coding, and billing rules."77 One commentator lamented on
the voluminous regulations and the "complete alphabet soup" of
government agencies, programs, and intricacies involved in providing
healthcare services.
The complexity of health care related statutes,
regulations, rules, and policies is particularly problematic in distinguishing
between fraud and mistake. Providers can easily manipulate complex rules,
such as procedures for ICD-9 coding, to submit improper claims.79 If
caught, they may feign ignorance and confusion, blaming the complex
system. 80 Nonetheless, even critics of this "complexity defense" concede
that well-meaning providers do in fact make legitimate mistakes as a result
of program complexities.
Types of fraud and abuse. Healthcare fraud and abuse come in many
forms; however, instances of fraud and abuse often fall within one of the
following categories: 2
1. "Mischarge" cases. The most common cases of healthcare fraud
involve the mischarging of claims to the government.83 In these
cases, medical providers either bill for services that were never

75. Id. at 1-21 - 1-22; see also Jost & Davies, supra note 73, at 253-54.
76. See Leonard C. Homer, If Successor Liability Under the Medicare Program Is
Inevitable: Due DiligenceIssues That May Be the Basis for False Claims Act and Medicare
Program Penalty Liability, in HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE: How To NAVIGATE THE
COMPLIANCE PROCESS 57, 57 (Paul R. DeMuro ed., 1999).

77.

Id.

78.
79.

KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 1.
See TORRAS, supra note 1, at 273.

80. See Jost & Davies, supra note 73, at 294.
81. See, e.g., id at 293-94. The authors argue that fraud abuse laws do not permit
penalties for unintentional conduct. Id. at 294-95. This argument essentially dismisses
Medicare and Medicaid complexity as a legitimate defense "in light of the rigorous intent
obligations imposed by law." See id. at 303. 1 would argue, however, that the intent
requirements are not so rigorous in practice. As this paper later explores, the federal
government arguably has an available remedy on the gamut of intent obligations. See
discussion infra Parts IIE, III. The authors also posit that the complexity problem is actually
overstated, considering the specialized practices and sophisticated billing systems used by
modem healthcare providers. See Jost & Davies, supra note 73, at 303-04.
82. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 1-40 (Aspen Publishers
3d ed. vol. 1, 2008) [hereinafter CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS]. Mr. Boese includes a fifth category

of false claims, the "substandard product or service" case, which essentially falls within the
category of "mischarge" cases. See id at 1-40, 1-42.1.
83. Id. at 1-40.
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rendered or overcharge the government for medical services or
supplies.
2. "False negotiation" cases. Referred to by some courts as "frauds-inthe-inducement," false negotiation cases arise from situations in
which a provider makes false statements to induce the government to
enter into a contract for services or supplies. 84
3. "False certification" cases. These cases, as exemplified in the
Introduction's hypothetical controversy with Corazon Medical, Inc.,
involve healthcare providers making false certifications of
compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements for
reimbursement to the government.
United States ex rel. Mikes v.
Strauss, for example, is a "false certification" case concerning the
quality of care in a nursing home. 8 6 The defendants allegedly
performed spirometry procedures in violation of the American
Thoracic Society's guidelines.8 7 Due to complex and voluminous
rules and regulations, false certification cases are especially
problematic.
4. "Reverse false claim" cases. Reverse false claims occur when a
provider makes a false statement in order to avoid paying the
government what it owes, in violation of § 3729(a)(1)(G) of the
FCA.
Efforts to reduce fraud. The driving force behind the government's
efforts to reduce healthcare fraud is, of course, money. As mentioned
above, healthcare fraud and abuse results in a significant loss of public
funds. Additionally, the massive healthcare expenditures spurred the
government to try and contain program costs. 89 Through its anti-fraud
efforts, the government has recovered enormous sums of money. 90 One
estimate has the government recovering $15 for every $1 spent on FCA-

84. Id.
85. Id. at 1-42.
86. United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 2001).
87. Id.
88. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2006); see CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 82, at 1-42.2,
2-8 (discussing § 3729(a)(7) of the FCA prior to the FERA amendments, which expressly
established a reverse false claim provision).
89. See Shaffer, supra note 35, at 996-98.
90. John T. Boese, Can Substandard Medical Care Become Fraud? Understandingan
Unfortunate Expansion of Liability Under the Civil False Claims Act, 29 BRIEF 30 (2000)
[hereinafter Can Substandard Medical Care Become Fraud?]. In 2001, the federal
government recovered $1.22 billion in Medicare and Medicaid anti-fraud enforcement
efforts. Stephanie L. Trunk, Sounding the Death Toll for Health Care Providers: How the
Civil False Claims Act Has a Punitive Effect and Why the Act Warrants Reform of Its
Damages and PenaltiesProvision, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 161 (2003).
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related litigation. 91 These gains serve to encourage the expansion of
enforcement actions as well as the scope of anti-fraud laws.92
Multiple facets of the U.S. government responded to the healthcare
problem with increased attention on fighting fraud. Congress has passed
legislation and numerous amendments to reduce fraud and punish
transgressors more severely, including the FCA, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,93 the Program Fraud Civil
Remedies Act of 1986,94 and mail and wire fraud statutes. 95 The OIG
issued annual work plans, model compliance programs, fraud alerts,
For its part, the DOJ
advisory opinions, guidelines, and news releases.
designated healthcare fraud as a top priority.97
Although fraud enforcement efforts have historically focused on
Medicare, the federal government has sought more action against Medicaid
fraud.98 In February 2006, Congress passed § 6031 of the Deficit Reduction
Act (DRA). 99 This legislation creates a monetary incentive for states to
enact their own false claims legislation to battle Medicaid fraud. 00 The
DRA also requires healthcare providers receiving $5 million or more in
Medicaid payments to establish a compliance program to reduce fraud. 01
But what about small-business providers who are not required to have
compliance programs (and probably cannot afford to establish one
anyway)? Even absent compliance programs, they will still be fully liable
for submitting false claims. Small-business providers will suffer most from
the harsh effects of anti-fraud laws, such as the potentially devastating
monetary fines imposed by the FCA.

91. Degnan & Scoggin, supra note 4, at 386.
92. See Can SubstandardMedical Care Become Fraud?,supra note 90, at 30.
93. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act extends anti-fraud
enforcement efforts to encompass offenses against private payers. TORRAS, supra note 1, at
60.
94. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3812 (2006). The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act focuses on
smaller false claims violations and allows for slightly lighter damages than the False Claims
Act. CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 82, at 1-43.
95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1343 (2006).
96. Paul R. DeMuro & John D. Whipple, Government's Current Compliance Initiatives
- 1999, in HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE: HOW TO NAVIGATE THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS 11,
18-19 (Paul R. DeMuro ed., 1999).
97. Nicole A. Berryman, Health Care Fraud,38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 915, 915 (2001).
98. Shaffer, supra note 35, at 999.
99. Michael A. Igel, A Perfect 10: The Deficit Reduction Act of2005 Provides Incentive
for Floridato Amend Its Own False Claims Act Legislation, 81 FLA. B.J. 23, 23-24 (2007).
100. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(68)(A)-(B) (Supp. 2009).
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II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
In its fight against healthcare fraud and abuse, the U.S. government
wields a potent statutory weapon: the False Claims Act.102 Critics have
characterized the U.S. government's increased use of the FCA against the
healthcare industry as a mechanism "to bully"' 0 3 providers and to "inflict a
Some
death blow on already struggling healthcare institutions."'0
commentators, on the other hand, view it as an "undeniably beneficial" tool
Regardless of one's
to combat the dangers of healthcare fraud. 0 5
perception, the reality is that the FCA, as employed against unsophisticated
healthcare providers, is merciless in its enforcement.
A. Elements of the FCA

At its core, the FCA establishes civil liability against a healthcare
provider who:
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim;

(G)knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and
improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government .. .106
These provisions can be broken down into the following elements: 07
Knowing. 0

The FCA's scienter requirement mandates, as a general

102. Shaffer, supra note 35, at 999.
103. See Trunk, supra note 90, at 160.
104. Can SubstandardMedical Care Become Fraud?,supra note 9 t, at 30.
105. Raegan A. McClain, The Government, the Legislature and the Judiciary--Working
Towards Remedying the Problems With the Civil False Claims Act: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 10 ANNALS HEALTH L. 191, 242 (2001).
106. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).
107. Courts are split over whether a showing of damages is a required element under the
FCA and is therefore not included. See Can SubstandardMedical Care Become Fraud?,
supra note 91, at 31.
108. The scienter requirement is explored in more detail in Part II, Subpart E, below.
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rule, that a defendant know, in some way, that the claim was false. 109
Presentment. For liability to attach under Subsection (a)(1)(A) of the
FCA, an actual presentment of the false claim must be made. 10
Presentment, though, is not required under Subsections (a)(1)(B) or (G)."
To the U.S. government. The false or fraudulent claims must be made to
the federal government before liability attaches. Courts, however, have
held that claims submitted to state-managed Medicaid programs constitute a
presentment to the U.S. government.' 12 Furthermore, government agents,
including federal agencies like CMS and government contractors like CMS
carriers and intermediaries, fall within the FCA's scope.11 3
Of a claim. Prior to FERA, the FCA defined a "claim" as "any request or
demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property."114
The FERA amendments redefined "claim" to include any claim regardless
of whether or not the United States has title to the money or property.
Thus, healthcare providers' claims for reimbursement under either
Medicare or Medicaid are actionable FCA claims.
That is false or fraudulent. The terms "false" and "fraudulent" are not
defined by the FCA. Generally, though, to be held liable under the FCA, a
defendant must have submitted a claim that is in fact false. 115 In addition, a
"materiality" element must be shown. For pre-FERA claims, the falsity of
the claim must be material to the government's decision to pay or approve
the claim.116
The FERA amendments, however, explicitly defined
109. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F.
Supp. 399, 402 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 125 F.3d 899
(5th Cir. 1997); see also Ann DesRuisseaux, A New Form of Abuse in the Health Care
Field: The Federal Government's Abuse of the FCA in Pursuing Medicare and Medicaid
Fraud and Abuse 6 (1999) (outlining the elements of a FCA claim) (unpublished LL.M.
thesis, University of Houston Law Center) (on file with O'Quinn Law Library, University of
Houston Law Center).
110. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 671 (2008) (with
respect to § 3729(a) of the pre-FERA FCA); see also United States ex rel. Sterling v. Health
Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1141 (PAC) 2008 WL 4449448, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sep. 30, 2008).
111. Allison Engine Co., 553 U.S. at 671; Sterling, 2008 WL 4449448, at *3.
112. See United States ex rel. Davis v. Long's Drugs, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1144, 1149
(S.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that California's Medicaid program qualified for federal funds and
had substantial contacts with the federal government although the program was entirely
state-run); see United States ex rel. Putnam v. E. Idaho Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 696 F. Supp. 2d
1190, 1200 (D. Idaho 2010).
113. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(E) (2006); but see United States ex rel. Totten v.
Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reasoning that Amtrak cannot be
considered part of the Government, despite having received sizeable government subsidies
and being a "mixed-ownership government corporation").
114. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A).
115.

CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 82, at 2-8.

116.

See id. at 2-158.6 - 2-158.7; but see United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power
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"material" as "having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property."I 17 This
definition, therefore, relaxes the materiality requirement, making it easier
for the government to establish liability under the FCA.
B. Qui Tam Provision"8
The most controversial aspect of the FCA is the qui tam1 9 provision.
This unique feature of the statute enables third parties, known as "relators,"
to sue suspected defrauders on behalf of the federal government.120 When a
relator initiates a qui tam action, the government may opt to either intervene
or allow the relator to pursue litigation on its own.'21 In exchange for their
roles as fraud enforcement substitutes, relators are entitled to a percentage
of the recovery from a successful suit, including settlement awards.12 2 If
the government intervenes, the relator is apportioned "at least 15 percent
but not more 25 percent of the proceeds" resulting from the lawsuit; if the
government declines to intervene, the relator can recover between 25
percent and 30 percent of the proceeds.12 3 These potentially large monetary
sums serve as powerful incentives for relators to bring suit.124 The Fifth
Circuit in United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ. even
acknowledges that the FCA "provides for what can amount to massive
rewards for" relators.12 5
One of the major criticisms of the qui tam provision is that the FCA does
not require relators to possess direct or independent knowledge of
wrongdoing before bringing suit.12 6 As such, relators can sue based solely
Techs, 575 F.3d 458, 468-70 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a statement is material if it has the
potential to influence the government's payment decision).
117. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4).
118.

See generally CIvIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 82 at 4-9 - 4-316 (discussing an in-

depth analysis of qui tam litigation under the FCA).
119. "Qui tam" (pronounced "kwi tam") is a short-form version of the Latin phrase qui
tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which translates to "who as
well for the king as for himself sues in this matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed.
2004).
120.

CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 821, at 1-4 - 1-5.

121. Id. at 4-9 - 4-19.
122. Id. at 4-201.
123. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(d)(1)-(d)(2) (1995).
124. Degnan & Scoggin, supra note 4, at 385.
125. United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1999)
(stating that plaintiff "seeks to collect a Texas-sized reward based on her allegations of over
400,000 false claims (which could generate fines of between $5,000 and $10,000 each) and
over $20 million in overpayments (which § 3279(a) would treble).").
126. Todd J. Canni, Who's Making False Claims, the Qui Tam Plaintiff or the
Government Contractor? A Proposal to Amend the FCA to Require That All -Qui Tam
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on suspicion, speculation, or even a "scintilla of knowledge."' 2 7
Because of this low threshold, small healthcare providers are especially
vulnerable to qui tam actions. Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, former
and current employees, acquaintances, competitors, et al., can file
complaints without having any direct knowledge of a single false claim
having been submitted.128 Unlike large hospitals, community clinics (and
comparable medical providers) do not have the hundreds of thousands, or
millions of dollars, needed to adequately defend against FCA suits.129 They
would be forced to quickly capitulate and settle, despite the absence of any
meaningful evidence. The alternative, unfortunately, is to face the even
stiffer penalties from a negative FCA judgment.
C. FCA Damages

The potential damages to a healthcare provider found in violation of the
FCA can be astounding. Liability for a provider found to knowingly have
submitted a false Medicare or Medicaid claim, is "a civil penalty of not less
than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus three times the amount of
damages which the Government sustains."' 30 These penalties are assessed
per claim submitted.131 Considering that each drug prescription filled by a
pharmaceutical provider may be viewed as a separate claim, the penalties
can, and often do, multiply rapidly.' 32
For the small, struggling, or newly-formed medical providers, these
mounting damages can realistically run them out of business. 33
Accordingly, commentators and healthcare institutions have criticized the

Plaintiffs Possess Direct Knowledge, 37 PUB. CONT. L. J. 1, 2 (2007).
127. Id. at 2, 14.
128. See Degnan & Scoggin, supra note 4, at 387.
129. Id at 386-87; See Joan H. Krause, Twenty-Five Years of Health Law Through the
Lens of the Civil False Claims Act, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 13, 15 (2010).
130. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006). The government must show that its losses were
actually sustained as a result of the falsity of the claim. United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d
968, 972 (5th Cir. 1983). In other words, the government "should recover, as single
damages, the amount it actually paid minus the amount it would have paid had the claim not
been false." See CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 82, at 3-5. In 1999, the monetary penalties

allowed under the FCA was adjusted upwards to a minimum of $5,500 and a maximum of
$11,000 per claim, to reflect inflation. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (2010).
131. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729; see also United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171
F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that claims can generate fines between $5,000 and
$10,000 dollars each).
132. See Edward P. Lansdale, Used As Directed? How ProsecutorsAre Expanding the
False Claims Act to Police PharmaceuticalOff-Label Marketing, 41 NEw ENG. L. REV 159,
177-78 (Fall 2006).
133. See Can SubstandardMedical Care Become Fraud?,supra note 90, at 30.
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Defendants have even
FCA's damages provision as exorbitant.13 4
damages,
contending that the
challenged the constitutionality of assessed
FCA violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 135 In
contrast, supporters of the FCA defend the government's ability to levy
heavy fines as an "optimal deterrence" against future fraud.136 These two
viewpoints stand at opposite sides in a battle of statutory interpretation: the
determinative question being whether the FCA serves a remedial or
punitive purpose.1
D. History and Purpose
The remedial versus punitive debate must begin with a look back at the
initial passage of the FCA. Congress passed the FCA in 1863 to counter the
actions of unscrupulous government contractors, and President Lincoln
signed the bill into law at the height of the Civil War.13 8 The FCA was
enacted with the principal goal of "stopping the massive frauds perpetrated
by large [private] contractors."' 39
The overarching purpose of the FCA, as a tool to combat government
contracting fraud, remains today. But whether the FCA achieves this
purpose through restitution or deterrence and punishment remains an issue
of contention. The Supreme Court's majority decision in United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess succinctly emphasized the FCA's original purposes.140
Justice Black wrote for the majority:
[O]ne of the chief purposes of the Act, which was itself first passed in
war time, was to stimulate action to protect the government against war
frauds.

We think the chief purpose of the statutes here was to provide for
restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud, and the
device of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure
that the government would be made completely whole.141

134. Trunk, supranote 90, at 161-62.
135. Id. at 169-71.
136. See Jost & Davies, supra note 73, at 266-69.
137. Trunk, supra note 91, at 171.
138. CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 82, at 1-6.
139. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781
(2000) (quoting United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976)).
140. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547-48 (1943).
141. Id. at 547-51 (emphasis added) (commenting on 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2006),
the FCA now calling for treble damages); but see S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted
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Along similar lines, another federal court concluded that the FCA's
damages provision was "meant by Congress to reflect a fair ratio to
damages in order to make sure the government would be made completely

whole."142
The FCA has since been amended three times, in 1943, 1986, and most
recently in 2009.143 The 1943 amendments limited the scope of the FCA's
qui tam provision because of the "parasitical actions" of relators at the
time.144 The 1986 amendments reversed course, however, and provided
greater monetary incentives to relators.14 5 The Congressional record
accompanying the 1986 amendments stated the legislative intent behind
strengthening the FCA as: "[t]he purpose of S. 1562, the False Claims
Reform Act, is to enhance the Government's ability to recover losses
sustained as a result of fraud against the Government."l146 In laying the
background for the amendments, the record later reasons, "[a]lthough the
Government may also pursue common law contract remedies, the False
Claims Act is a much more powerful tool in deterring fraud." 4 7 The
Supreme Court seemed to concur with that assessment when it concluded in
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens that FCA
damages are "essentially punitive in nature." 4 8 In analyzing the postFERA FCA provisions, particularly § 3729(a)(1)(B), at least one federal
court has concluded that the "FCA's statutory scheme is punitive in purpose
and effect ....
Not everyone agrees, however, that the damages provision is punitive. In
the Vt. Agency decision, Justice Stevens, joined in his dissent by Justice
Souter, declined to characterize the damages as punitive.150

in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274 ("The False Claims Act is intended to reach all fraudulent
attempts.. . . A false claim for reimbursement under the Medicare, Medicaid, or similar
program is actionable under the act .... ).
142. Peterson v. Richardson, 370 F. Supp. 1259, 1267 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
143.

See generally CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 82, at 1-12 -

1-17; Fraud

Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009); 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).
144. Lansdale, supra note 132, at 169.
145. Id. at 170.
146. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1.
147. Id. at 4.
148. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 78485 (2000) (reasoning that the Supreme Court's earlier suggestions that FCA damages were
remedial were based upon the double damages allowed, as opposed to the modem FCA's
treble damages, which demonstrate an intent to punish and deter).
149. United States ex rel. Baker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 05-279 WJ/WDS, 2010
LEXIS 51545, at *19 (D. N.M. Mar. 19, 2010).
150. See Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at 801-02.
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E. The Eroding Scienter Requirement
Despite the FCA's original purpose as a remedial measure to combat
contractor fraud, the federal government has increasingly manipulated the
statute in aggressive and unconventional ways. 51 As detailed above, it has
provided greater incentives for qui tam actions and expanded enforcement
efforts to diverse industries, including health care. In doing so, and perhaps
driven in part by the attention-grabbing recoveries, the government
gradually eroded the FCA's scienter requirement. It sought to continuously
push the outer limits of what constitutes a "knowing" presentment of false

claims.15 2
As contemplated by the first enactment of the FCA, liability attaches
only when a healthcare provider "knowingly" submits a false or fraudulent
claim to the government.' 53 Innocent mistakes, negligent actions, and
flawed reasoning are purportedly not actionable under the FCA.154 The
1986 amendments, however, lowered the FCA's scienter requirement. 5 5
Subsequently, neither actual knowledge nor a specific intent to defraud the
government is required to establish liability.156 Beyond actual knowledge,
the FCA's definition of "knowingly" expanded to include: (1) the deliberate
ignorance and (2) reckless disregard of the falsity of the claim. 57
Deliberate Ignorance. Even without actual knowledge, a medical
provider may be liable under the FCA based on "deliberate ignorance" of
Medicare or Medicaid regulations. 58 A provider that is "willfully blind" to
regulations and the consequences of misconduct, can be found deliberately
ignorant.' 59 Proving deliberate ignorance requires evidence that the
provider purposely avoided learning of, or blinded itself to, the falsity of the
submitted claims.' 60 Thus, before FCA liability can attach, the government
(or a qui tam plaintiff) must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, two
things: first, that the provider had reason to believe its actions may have
been unlawful; and second, that the provider purposely failed to investigate

these suspicions.161
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See Can SubstandardMedical Care Become Fraud?,supra note 90, at 30.
See Trunk, supranote 90, at 164.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 681-82 (5th Cir. 2003).
See CIvIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 82, at 1-18-1-19.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1).
Id.; see also Southland, 326 F.3d at 681-82.
See United States v. Erikson, 75 F.3d 470, 481 (9th Cir. 1996).

159.

See id

160. Id.; United States v. Lara-Valesquez, 919 F.2d 946, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1990)
(defining "deliberate ignorance" in the context of a criminal jury charge).
161. See Erikson, 75 F.3d at 481.
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Reckless Disregard. A healthcare provider may also be liable under the
FCA based on a "reckless disregard" of a submitted claim's falsity. 6 2
Federal courts are not perfectly aligned when applying the reckless
disregard standard. Most courts, following the D.C. Circuit's lead in United
States v. Krizek, construed reckless disregard as equivalent to "aggravated
gross negligence" or "gross negligence plus."l 63 The Eighth Circuit, in a
case predating the 1986 amendments to the FCA's scienter requirement,
approached the "knowing" element in a similar, but different, fashion: "The
question here then would be whether the defendants' 'clumsiness' or
'carelessness and foolishness in the extreme' constitute conduct that the
court can deem to create sufficient knowledge or awareness under the False
Claims Act to be civilly actionable."'6
Whether this "extreme
carelessness" standard is the equivalent of gross negligence or the more
stringent gross negligence-plus standard remains unclear.
Gross negligence has been characterized as a conscious indifference to a
high risk that harm would result from an act or omission.' 6 5 For instance,
gross negligence under Texas state law has two elements: (1) objectively,
the act or omission must involve an extreme degree of risk, and (2) "the
actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but
nevertheless proceed in conscious indifference. ... "166 In Pennsylvania,
gross negligence has been construed to mean the "lack of slight diligence or
care," "a conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a
legal duty," and "a form of negligence where the facts support substantially
more than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference."' 6 7
Although gross negligence (without more) is supposedly not actionable
under the FCA,168 many FCA cases apply what appears to be an ordinary
gross negligence standard and not the heightened Krizek gross negligence
plus standard purportedly adopted by most Circuits. For example, in United
States ex rel. Kosenske, MD. v. CarlisleHMA, Inc., the district court cited

162.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).

163. United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the
standard for reckless disregard is, at a minimum, an extreme version of ordinary negligence);
United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., 513 F. Supp. 2d 866, 876 (S.D. Tex.
2007).
164. United States v. Coop. Grain and Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 56 (8th Cir. 1973).
165. Helms v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 202 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir. 1953); see
Crowder v. Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc., 118 Fed. App'x 833, 840-41 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying
the gross negligence standards of both Texas and Louisiana common law).
166. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Tex. 1994).
167. United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 2010 WL 1390661, at *7 n.7
(M.D. Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).
168. United States ex rel. Ervin and Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton Sec. Grp., 298 F. Supp. 2d
91, 101 (D.D.C. 2004).
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to the Krizek decision in determining the qui tam relator "must show that
defendants acted with aggravated gross negligence."1 6 9 Despite this, the
court proceeded to define ordinary gross negligence and performed a factual
analysis based on this standard, essentially equating reckless disregard with
gross negligence. 170
In United States v. Mack, the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas applied the Krizek "gross negligence plus" standard"' and held that
the defendant demonstrated a reckless disregard for the falsity of the claim
by failing to adequately supervise his billing staff.172 To reach its
conclusion, the court considered a number of factors: (1) the defendant's
knowledge of prior deviant billings, (2) his failure to hire full-time staff, (3)
his failure to properly train the part-time staff, and (4) his failure to read or
require that his staff read the Medicaid manual that set out provider
requirements. 173 These negligent actions, viewed in the aggregate, met the
Krizek "gross negligence plus" standard for reckless disregard.174 The
actions evidenced the defendant's conscious indifference to the high risk of
false claims. 75
In United States v. Stevens, the District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky granted the government summary judgment against a defendant
who completely delegated the Medicare reimbursement claims process to
his billing manager (and father-in-law). Based on its reading of Krizek, the
court held that the defendant, even though he may not have had any actual
knowledge of the clinic's billing practices, was required to take reasonable
steps to ensure the accuracy of the claims for reimbursement. The court
concluded that Dr. Stevens "utterly failed" to ensure the accuracy of the
claims, comparing his inaction with the defendant's in Krizek.176 The
Stevens case, among others, approaches the scienter requirement almost in a
way that transfers the burden of proof to the defendant."7 Although the
FCA requires the government (or qui tam relator) to establish the
"knowing" element, courts have treated defendants' excuses and assertions
169.

Kosenske, 2010 WL 1390661 at *7.

170.

Id. at *7 - 9.

171. See United States v. Mack, No. 98-1488, 2000 WL 33993336, at*5 (S.D. Tex. May
16, 2000) (explaining that "the billing provider must manifest, at a minimum "an extreme
version of ordinary negligence" in the submission of false claims.") (citing United States v.
Krizek, Il l F.3d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
172. Id at *7.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. United States v. Stevens, 605 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868-69 (W.D. Ky. 2008).
177. See id; See also UMC Electronics Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 776, 794 (Fed.
Cl. 1999).
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of lack of knowledge like an affirmative defense, further eroding the FCA's
scienter requirement.
In UnitedStates ex rel. Schaefer v. Conti Medical Concepts, Inc., another
FCA case out of the Western District of Kentucky, the district court
correctly declined to grant summary judgment for the government. Despite
the complicated coding system for back braces involved and the lack of any
evidence of actual knowledge of coding errors on the part of the defendants,
the government sought liability under the FCA, relying on the decisions in
Krizek and Stevens. The court, however, distinguished those cases in
determining the facts at issue did not warrant summary judgment.17 8
Conti Medical Concepts, Inc., in particular, is a case representing an
alarming trend by the government to pursue negligent, or even grossly
negligent, actions as fraud.'19 Due to a multitude of factors-be it program
complexity, inexperience, lackadaisical attitudes, or even sheer stupidityhealthcare providers, especially those in small practices and businesses,
may make a number of mistakes and bad judgments that could lead to the
submission of false claims. Because the FCA is meant to address
fraudulent actions against the government, however, innocent mistakes and
negligence are not sufficient to hold a Medicare or Medicaid provider
liable.180 Thus, poor business acumen, including mere noncompliance with
CMS regulations and the failure to properly train one's staff, is not enough
for FCA liability. 8' The penalties are simply too harsh to justify. Rather,
the provider must have submitted a false or fraudulent claim knowinglythat is, with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard of
the claim's falsity.18 2
F. The FERA Amendments
In addition to the eroding scienter requirement, amendments to the FCA
in 2009 have further inched the FCA towards becoming a general anti-fraud
statute.' 83 The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) was passed
and signed into law on May 20, 2009.184 The primary purpose of FERA

178. United States ex rel. Schaefer v. Conti Med. Concepts, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-400-H,
2009 WL 5104149, at *4-6 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 17, 2009).
179. See id.
180. See United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 681-682 (5th Cir.
2003).
181. See id.
182. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (2006).
183. See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)
(warning that the FCA is not an all-purpose antifraud statute).
184. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617
(2009).
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was to combat the financial and mortgage-related frauds that led to the
economic crisis in 2008.185 Healthcare fraud was not the principal concern.
In fact, the statement issued by President Obama regarding FERA does not
mention healthcare fraud at all: "These legislative enhancements will help
the Department of Justice to combat mortgage fraud, securities and
commodities fraud, and related offenses, and to protect taxpayer money that
has been expended on recent economic stimulus and rescue packages."' 86
Nonetheless, FERA amended the FCA to make it a more effective tool
against government fraud in general, including healthcare fraud. The FERA
amendments renumbered several provisions of the FCA, altered the
These
statutory language, and added or redefined certain terms.' 87
amendments expressly established, inter alia, a new, less cumbersome
standard for the "materiality" element of an FCA claim and the courtinvented reverse false claim.' 88 Arguably, though, the primary goal of the
FERA amendments to the FCA was to address the liability issues
surrounding government contractors and subcontractors.' 8 9
These amendments may have been necessary to effectively enforce
against fraud perpetrated by large financial institutions at the root of the
economic crisis or by those unscrupulous defense contractors taking
advantage of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, application of
the FERA amendments to small medical providers is unnecessary and
without justification. The primary concerns that drove FERA into lawnamely, mortgage and financial fraud-are simply not relevant to health
clinics, suppliers of durable medical equipment, or other small healthcare
providers. Likewise, the ability of subcontractors to escape liability under
the pre-FERA FCA has little application to the world of small medical
providers. Courts have already established that claims for Medicaid
payments are subject to the FCA.190 Small medical providers are also
unlikely to enter into the kinds of complicated subcontracting arrangements
185. See id; see S. REP. No. 111-10, at 2 (2009), reprintedin 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430,
432-433.
186. Press Release, White House, Pres. Barack Obama, (May 20, 2009) (2009 WL
1398364).
187. For example, subsection 3729(a) was stricken and replaced with subsections
3729(a)(1) and (2); the language "to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
Government" in old § 3279(a)(2) was stricken and the terms "claim," "obligation," and
"material" were redefined in § 3729(b). Pub. L. No. 111-21, at 1621-23.
188. See supra Part II.A.
189. S. REP. No. 111-10, at 4 (stating that "[t]he effectiveness of the False Claims Act
has recently been undermined by court decisions which limit the scope of the law and, in
some cases, allow subcontractors paid with Government money to escape responsibility for
proven frauds").
190. United States ex rel. Putnam v. E. Idaho Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 696 F. Supp. 2d 1190,
1195-96 (D. Idaho 2010).
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that the FERA amendments address. 19' Moreover, subcontractors would
still be liable to the government for fraudulent claims under alternative
remedies to the FCA-remedies that are much more appropriate in scale to
the unsophisticated healthcare provider.
III. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
Healthcare providers that make multiple mistakes and perform
negligently should by no means benefit from the dereliction of their duties
as Medicare and Medicaid participants. In these circumstances (e.g., United
States v. Mack), though, the government should refrain from employing the
FCA. Employing the FCA would certainly deter similar actions in the
future, but it would also inflict massive penalties. For many smaller
providers, FCA damages could serve as a "death blow" to their businesses,
even though they never committed actual fraud.192 Instead, the government
should seek to recoup its losses through alternative remedies, specifically
federal common-law doctrines.
Federal law applies to cases involving the rights of the United States
under a national program such as Medicare or Medicaid. 9 3 Furthermore,
the U.S. government can recover funds "wrongfully, erroneously, or
illegally" paid to healthcare providers.194 Federal courts have, thus,
recognized two theories for the government to recover funds that were
wrongfully, erroneously, or illegally paid out to providers: the common-law
doctrines of "unjust enrichment" and "payment by mistake."' 9 5
A. FederalDoctrineof Unjust Enrichment
The federal government may sue for equitable relief under the theory of
"unjust enrichment" to recover funds wrongfully or illegally paid to a
Medicare or Medicaid provider.196 To establish unjust enrichment, the
government must show that: (1) it had a reasonable expectation of payment,
(2) the participant should reasonably have expected to pay, or (3) society's
reasonable expectations of person and property would be defeated by
nonpayment. 197 Restitution for unjust enrichment, however, is available
191. See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 665-67
(2008); see S. REP. No. 111-10, at 10.
192. See Can SubstandardMedical Care Become Fraud?,supra note 90, at 30.
193. See United States v. Vernon Home Health, 21 F.3d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 1994).
194. See LTV Educ. Sys., Inc. v. Bell, 862 F.2d 1168, 1175 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing
United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 415 (1938)).
195. United States v. Medica-Rents Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 742, 776-77 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
196. See Heller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (allowing
reimbursement for ERISA payments).
197. United States ex rel. Roberts v. Aging Care Home Health, Inc. (Aging Care 1), 474

Published by LAW eCommons, 2011

23

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Annals of Health Law

72

[Vol. 20

only when no legal contract exists between the parties and when other
remedies are inadequate.' 9 8
Generally, Medicare and Medicaid
participation agreements do not create a contractual relationship between
providers and the federal government.'99 Instead, these agreements create
statutory rights under their respective programs. 200
B. Payment-by-Mistake Doctrine
In the alternative, the U.S. government may sue to recover its erroneous
payments through the doctrine of "payment by mistake." Regardless of a
statutory remedy, the government is entitled to recover funds it paid "under
an erroneous belief which was material to the decision to pay.20 ' The
government can recover funds from those parties who received
reimbursements directly or from third parties who "participated in and
benefited from the tainted transaction." 2 02 Federal district courts have
applied this "payment by mistake" doctrine when it is shown that: "(1)
payments were made (2) under the belief that they were properly owed; (3)
that belief being erroneously formed; and (4) the mistaken belief was
material to the decision to pay." 2 0 3 Furthermore, the government need not
show that the parties acted knowingly or that they were unjustly enriched.204
In establishing a mistaken payment, the critical question is whether or
not the erroneous belief was material to the decision to pay. 205 Courts
answered this question by holding that the government is entitled to recover
funds when it would not ordinarily pay a party due to statutory or regulatory
noncompliance.2 06 In United States v. Mead, for instance, the Court of
F. Supp. 2d 810, 820 (W.D. La. 2007) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller,
906 F.2d 985, 993-94 (4th Cir. 1990)).
198. Medica-Rents Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 777; United States ex rel. Zissler v. Regents
of the Univ. of Minn., 992 F.Supp. 1097, 1112 (D. Minn. 1998); see also Coop. Benefit
Admins., Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal common
law doctrine of unjust enrichment should be applied as a "gap" filler if statutory remedy
exists and is inapplicable where the statutory text is specific and clear).
199. See Medica-Rents Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 777 (citing Mem'l Hosp. v. Heckler, 706
F.2d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 1983)).
200. Aging Care I, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
201. United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 124 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing United States v.
Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 415-16 (1938)).
202. LTV Educ. Sys., Inc. v. Bell, 862 F.2d 1168, 1175 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Mead,
426 F.2d at 124).
203. Medica-Rents Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (quoting United States ex rel. Trim v.
McKean, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (W.D. Okla. 1998)).
204. See Mead, 426 F.2d at 125; see also Mt. Vernon Co-op. Bank v. Gleason, 367 F.2d
289, 291 (1st Cir. 1966).
205. See Mead, 426 F.2d at 124.
206. See id.; see also United States ex rel. Roberts v. Aging Care Home Health, Inc.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the defendants were liable for repayment
because the government paid them under the mistaken belief that the
defendants had complied with regulations promulgated by the Department
of Agriculture. 2 07 Had the government known about the defendants'
noncompliance, it would have paid out a much smaller amount of money.2 08
Similarly, the Louisiana District Court in United States ex rel. Roberts v.
Aging Care Home Health, Inc. granted the government's motion for partial
summary judgment for payment by mistake. 20 9 The court held that the
defendants' certifications of statutory compliance were false and, therefore,
material to the government's decision to pay.210 In Aging Care, however,
the statute in question expressly conditioned payment on compliance with
all of its provisions.2 1 1
C. Damages Under the Common Law Doctrines
Under the doctrines of unjust enrichment and payment-by-mistake, the
federal government is entitled to recover public funds wrongfully or
erroneously paid out (i.e., restitution).2 12 And unless explicitly precluded
by statute, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest may be applied at the
court's discretion.2 13 However, because these doctrines are equitable
remedies, punitive damages may not be assessed.2 14
With unjust enrichment and payment-by-mistake theories, the healthcare
provider may reduce restitution damages by the amount of those services or
supplies it would have been entitled to had the claim been submitted
correctly.2 15 Of course, in false certification cases, any amount of
reimbursement received from the government would be subject to
restitution; thus, the provider would have to return the full amount that the
government paid on the claim, plus interest. 216 Nonetheless, paying
(Aging Care 1), 474 F. Supp. 2d 810, 819 (W.D. La. 2007).
207. Mead,426 F.2d at 124.
208. See id
209. Aging Care I, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 819, 821.
213. Id. at 821 (granting the government post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. §
1961(a), but denying pre-judgment interest because of the government's delay in
intervening, the complexity of the legal issues, and the lengthy duration of the proceedings).
214. See id.
215. See United States v. Nazon, No. 93 C 5456, 1993 WL 410150, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
14, 1993). See, e.g., Martin v. Phillips, 440 A.2d 1124, 1126 (N.H. 1982).
216. Id. (explaining that "Nazon ... was barred from receiving [federal funds] as a
result of his exclusion from Medicare. . . . Even if Nazon provided top-notch medical
services, he was not entitled to Medicare reimbursement .... .").
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restitution to the government is a much more lenient and acceptable
sanction than the treble damages and fines under the FCA.
For example, in Aging Care II the Louisiana District Court determined
that, under the FCA, it "is required to award treble damages" and interest,
resulting in total fines against the defendant of $4,665,011.64.217 The court
then calculated that, under either an unjust enrichment or payment-bymistake theory, the defendant would have had to reimburse the government
only $427,503.88.218 Similarly, in United States v. Rogan the North
Carolina District Court concluded that the defendant, under the FCA, was
required to pay $64,259,032.50, whereas the government would only have
been entitled to $16,864,677.50, plus interest, under a payment-by-mistake
theory (referred to in that case as a "mistake-of-fact" claim) or at least
$10,000,000 under an unjust enrichment theory.219
IV. RECOMMENDATION

The federal government cannot reasonably expect unsophisticated
healthcare providers to navigate the maze of 15,000 Medicare
regulations, 2 20 400 pages of Medicare laws, thousands of pages of CMS
literature, 7,000 CPT codes, 22 1 and 51 idiosyncratic state Medicaid
programs.2 22 The government, nevertheless, imposes a duty on providers to
know the applicable laws. 2 23 Increasingly, failure to comply with these
voluminous laws and regulations translates to an automatic finding of
"reckless disregard" for a provider's obligations under Medicare or
Medicaid.2 24 Having so easily established the scienter requirement, the
government will proceed to sue the provider under the FCA, even though
fraud was never actually committed. This expansive use of the FCA results
in penalties far exceeding the harm done, and it should be curtailed.
In prosecuting future FCA actions against smaller healthcare providers,
the federal government should take into account the following concerns:
(1) the complexity of the nation's healthcare system,
(2) the incentives for relators to abuse the FCA's qui tam provision for
personal gain,
217. United States ex rel. Roberts v. Aging Care Home Health, Inc. (Aging Care II), No.
02-2199, 2008 WL 2945946, at *11 (W.D. La. Jul. 25, 2008).
218. Id.
219. United States v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 727-28 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
220. KLEIMAN, supra note 18, at 1.
221. Jost & Davies, supra note 73, at 262.
222. Shaffer, supra note 35, at 1006.
223. United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 2001).
224. Id.
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(3) the potentially devastating effects of FCA sanctions on smallbusiness providers,
(4) the disagreement over whether the FCA serves a remedial or punitive
purpose,
(5) the unwarranted erosion of the FCA's scienter requirement, and
(6) the availability of more equitable remedies.
Accordingly, I propose a simple recommendation to the Justice
Department: strictly limit application of the FCA to instances where fraud is
evident, and apply equitable remedies for recovery of public funds when
false claims were "unknowingly" submitted.
In its anti-fraud enforcement efforts, the government must clearly
delineate the line between remedial and punitive actions. If it seeks to
punish and deter the submission of false or fraudulent claims, it should
pursue damages under the FCA. To ensure that only true defrauders are
punished (as opposed to those providers lost in the jumble of regulations),
the government must strictly apply the FCA's scienter requirement.
Essentially, the "reckless disregard" standard should be interpreted as
''gross negligence plus" and not as the less stringent standard used in United
States v. Mack.22 5
In circumstances of provider negligence, mistake, confusion, or just poor
judgment, the federal government should pursue restitution under the
theories of "unjust enrichment" and "payment by mistake." The loss of
government reimbursement (plus interest) should serve notice to healthcare
providers to improve their business practices. Yet, without the FCA's harsh
penalties, unsophisticated medical providers would still be able to operate
and offer their services to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.
V. CONCLUSION

In support of the False Claims Act, President Lincoln described the
impetus for eliminating fraud against the government: "Worse than traitors
in arms are the men who pretend loyalty to the flag, feast and fatten on the
misfortunes of the Nation while patriotic blood is crimsoning the plains of
the South and their countrymen are mouldering [sic] in the dust." 226
Undoubtedly, the FCA has been an effective tool against private
contractors seeking to cheat the U.S. Treasury of public funds; too effective,
perhaps. Since the Civil War years, the government has expanded the scope
of the FCA considerably. Originally enacted as a remedial measure, the
225. United States v. Mack, No. Civ.H-98-1488, 2000 WL 33993336, at *7 (S.D. Tex.
May 16, 2000).
226. Trunk, supra note 90, at 159-60.
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FCA now functions to deter and punish more than to restore. The federal
government has recovered huge sums of money from FCA actions. The
government once enlisted the FCA to battle war profiteers, but in recent
decades, the focus has shifted to the healthcare industry, particularly
Medicare and Medicaid providers.
Alas, the government has aggressively pushed the FCA's limits,
effectively eroding the "knowledge" requirement in the statute. It has done
so despite the existence of equitable remedies that more appropriately make
the government whole. The government's expansive enforcement efforts
under the FCA now even reach providers that make simple billing errors or
negligently fail to comply with complex regulations. Many of these
providers cannot afford the expense of litigation, and many more cannot
survive the excessive penalties mandated by the FCA.
The use and interpretation of a statute naturally evolves over time.
But, if the government continues on its path to expand the scope of the
FCA, even President Lincoln, if alive today, would barely recognize this
formidable statute, once known as "Lincoln's Law."
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